A notion of an epistemic state is introduced as a generalization of common representations suggested for belief change. Based on it, we de ne a new kind of nonmonotonic inference relation corresponding to belief contractions. A number of representation results is established, covering both traditional AGM contractions and contractions that do not satisfy recovery.
Introduction
The main, though distant, purpose of this study consists in laying foundations for a general theory of belief change. We will attempt to achieve this aim by rejecting traditional reduction of epistemic states to belief sets, and introduce instead a notion of an epistemic state that explicitly embodies the essential features of current representations for belief change. It turns out that the suggested notion of an epistemic state almost coincides with models for nonmonotonic inference relations suggested in 8]. This will give us an opportunity to augment and develop further the idea of G ardenfors and Makinson that belief revision and nonmonotonic inference are actually \two sides of the same coin". In particular, we will show that belief contraction, viewed as an operation on epistemic states, corresponds to a new kind of a nonmonotonic inference relation with rules of the form \In the absence of A, believe that B". We will give a number of representation results for this new inference relation, depending on various constraints imposed on epistemic states. These results will cover a broad range of possible belief contraction functions, including traditional AGM contractions, as well as contractions that do not satisfy the recovery postulate. This is the plan of the paper.
Two main approaches to representing belief change have been suggested in the literature. The rst is a so-called AGM theory of belief change 1, 4] . The basic setting of the AGM representation is a pair consisting of a belief set and some preference mechanism (i.e., a selection function) allowing to choose among its maximal subtheories. An important special case of the formalism is obtained when the selection function is relational, that is, based on some preference order among the maximal subtheories (see 11]).
A major alternative solution to the problem of belief revision is based on an assumption that our corpus of beliefs is usually generated by some set of basic propositions. Changes in belief sets are determined in this case by changes in their underlying bases. Still, the resulting belief set on most of these accounts is also determined by imposing preference relations on the available alternatives.
The AGM theory is usually interpreted as a realization of a coherentist approach to belief change, while the theory of base change is seen as an embodiment of the foundational approach. In this study, however, we will nd a common ground for representing both.
Epistemic states and their belief sets
A common feature of the AGM and base representations is a preference structure on certain subsets of the belief set. In the case of the AGM paradigm, it is a preference on its maximal deductively closed subsets, while for the base representation it is a preference structure on the subtheories of the belief set that are generated by subsets of the base. The role of a base in this respect amounts to restricting the set of subtheories of the belief set that are considered as`serious' alternatives for a choice. If we assume that the relevant preference is relational, the above described common structure will amount to a structure consisting of (some) subtheories of the belief set, ordered by a preference relation. In this way we are arriving at the notion of an epistemic state that we are going to describe now.
Let L be a propositional language containing the usual classical connectives, and the associated classical entailment relation. As usual, sets of propositions closed with respect to will be called deductively closed.
De nition 2.1. An epistemic state E in the language L is a pair (B; ), where B is a a set of deductively closed theories in L called admissible belief states, while is a preference relation on B .
If s t, we will say that the belief state t is preferred to the state t.
The two major representations of belief change can be seen as special cases of the above construction. More exactly, a relational AGM framework can be identi ed with an epistemic state (K?; ), where K? contains K and all its maximal deductively closed subsets. It is important to note that the same e ect can be achieved by considering an epistemic state (K; ), where K is a set of all subtheories of K and is a preference relation on K that satis es a monotonicity (`maximizing') property with respect to set inclusion: Monotonicity If u v, then u v.
Base-generated belief states can be identi ed with another special class of epistemic states, namely with states of the form (B; ), where B is a set of theories determined by subsets of the base B:
Moreover, in most cases the preference relation is also assumed to satisfy the above monotonicity property, though it is restricted now to theories from B .
An epistemic state gives raise to a natural notion of belief acceptance that will determine the set of beliefs associated with this state.
De nition 2.2. A proposition will be said to be believed in an epistemic state E if it holds in all maximally preferred admissible belief states from E. The set of all propositions believed in E will be called a belief set of E , and it will be denoted by B E .
Thus, even if an epistemic state contains con icting preferred belief states, we can still believe in propositions that hold in all of them. It is important to observe that the AGM theory of belief change presupposes the above criterion of belief acceptance with respect to propositions that`survive' a change. Thus, a proposition will belong to a contracted belief state if it belongs to all preferred maximal sub-theories of the initial state that do not include the proposition being contracted. On our approach, this is how we should accept our beliefs from the very beginning.
The belief set B E of an epistemic state E does not always constitute an admissible belief state of E by itself. The latter will hold, however, in an ideal situation when an epistemic state contains a most preferred admissible belief state that includes, in addition, all other admissible belief sets. We will call such epistemic states coherent in what follows. Coherent epistemic states will turn out to be appropriate for representing`traditional' belief change functions. On our account, however, coherence should not be taken as a`rationality constraint' on contractions: we argue that adherence to coherence may lead to unjusti ed loss of information in the context of iterated belief change operations. Accordingly, we claim that a more broad class of epistemic states should be taken into account in performing such operations.
A proposition will be said to be known (or rmly believed in an epistemic state E if it holds in all admissible belief states from E. As we will see, the set of known propositions, denoted by K E can be viewed as determining thè internal logic' of epistemic states.
The two components of an epistemic state serve as representations of two basic kinds of relations holding among propositions. The rst component, B , represents a`foundationalist' dependence structure by the very fact that it restricts the set of allowable alternatives: only admissible belief sets are considered as`serious possibilities' for the agent. On the other hand, re ects `coherentist' preference relation that allows to choose among the available alternatives. Accordingly, we will introduce two`extreme' kinds of epistemic states that can be seen as corresponding, respectively, to purely coherentist and purely foundationalist paradigm.
De nition 2.3. 1. A coherent epistemic state E will be called homogeneous if the set of admissible belief states B coincides with the set of all deductively closed theories that include the knowledge set and are included in the belief set of E.
2. An epistemic state will be called pure if coincides with the set inclusion on the theories from E. Homogeneous epistemic states presuppose, in e ect, that no dependence relations hold among believed propositions, except for logical ones, and hence any deductively closed subset of the belief set is admissible. Consequently, the structure of such a state is determined solely by a preference relation on all subtheories of the belief set. Notice that the AGM paradigm belongs to this class, but involves an additional`maximizing' property that the preference relation should satisfy monotonicity. This additional assumption is rejected in another coherentist approach to belief change suggested by Isaac Levi (see below).
Pure epistemic states`trivialize' the preferential component of the notion of an epistemic state by reducing it to set inclusion among admissible theories. So, a pure epistemic state can be identi ed, in e ect, with a set of deductively closed theories. As we show in 2], pure epistemic states can be described in terms of dependence relationships holding between believed propositions. In this way the framework of pure epistemic states allows to represent a (moderately) foundationalist approach to belief change.
Contractions of epistemic states
Admissible belief states of an epistemic state constitute all the potential alternatives that are considered as`serious possibilities' by the agent. In accordance with this, a contraction of a proposition from an epistemic state should amount simply to a removal of all admissible belief states that include the proposition.
De nition 2.4. A contraction of an epistemic state E = (B; ) with respect to a proposition A is an epistemic state, denoted by E ? A, determined by restricting B to the set of belief states that do not contain A.
Thus, contraction is a function that transforms epistemic states into new epistemic states. As a by-product, it certainly can change what is believed in an epistemic state, and in this sense it generates a certain change in its belief set B E . For any epistemic state E , we will denote by B E ? A the set of all propositions believed in E ? A. This set can be seen as a result of contracting the belief set B E with respect to A. If A was indeed present in B E , it will be removed from it as a result of such a contraction.
Contraction inference relations
This is the right moment to notice that our epistemic states are very similar to cumulative models for nonmonotonic inference, suggested in 8]. The similarity can even be strengthened if we describe the latter as triples (B; l; ), where B is a set of states ordered by a preference relation , while l is a function labeling each state with a deductively closed theory (which is equivalent to labeling with sets of worlds, as in 8]). Then our epistemic states can be seen as a special kind of such models when B is simply a set of theories and l an identity function.
The above similarity can be extended further. Any general cumulative model determines a nonmonotonic inference relation j de ned as follows: A j B is valid in a model i B holds in all preferred states that satisfy A. In contrast, B belongs to B E ? A if and only if B holds in all preferred states from E that do not satisfy A. Thus, ordinary nonmonotonic inference is based on singling out preferred states that satisfy some proposition, while the`contraction inference' is based on nding preferred states among those that do not satisfy a certain proposition. In other words, contractions of epistemic states give raise to a new kind of nonmonotonic inference relation that provides us with an alternative, though equivalent, way of describing contracted belief sets. A detailed study of this new inference relation will be the main subject for the rest of the paper.
We will introduce a new contraction inference relation having rules of the form A a B that we will call contraction rules. The intended meaning of such rules will be \B should be believed in the absence of A" or, in short, \B, unless A". The above description gives us the following semantic interpretation of our contraction inference: A a B holds in an epistemic state E i B holds in all preferred belief states from E that do not satisfy A.
As we have said, epistemic states correspond to a rather special kind of general cumulative models in which di erent states determine di erent sets of supported propositions (and consequently we can safely identify such states with their associated theories). It turns out, however, that such models cannot give us an adequate representation of many reasonable contraction functions, and hence our notion of an epistemic state need to be generalized in a similar way.
De nition 3.1. An abstract epistemic state E in a language L is a triple (B; l; ), where B is a set of objects called admissible belief states, l is a function assigning a deductively closed theory in L (called an admissible belief set) to every state from B , while is a preference relation on B .
As can be seen, the above de nition allows for a possibility that two admissible belief states are associated with the same set of beliefs. We will call an abstract epistemic state standard if the labeling function is injective, that is, no two admissible belief states are labeled with the same belief set. Standard states can be identi ed with ordinary epistemic states, as de ned earlier.
The main interpretation of non-standard epistemic states consists in the assumption that such states arise due to underdetermination with respect to available (or accepted) linguistic means: potential belief states may be determined by factors that simply have not found their way to the set of associated beliefs. A formal justi cation of this claim will be made later in the paper.
Postulates of contraction inference
We will give here postulates that characterize general contraction relations. To begin with, we give the`basic' postulates. Fortunately, all the above postulates are already known from the literature on belief change. Postulate (C7) is an exact counterpart of the AGM postulate (K{7). Partial Antitony can be found already in the initial AGM study, 1], and is shown there to be equivalent to (K{7). The proof, however, depends essentially on the recovery postulate which is absent from our list. Finally, postulates (C6) and (C8) exactly correspond to Rott's postulates (K-7c) and (K-8c) (see 10, 5] ). It can be shown that all the above postulates are mutually independent in our context.
As can be seen, the above postulates preserve much of the`rationality' behind AGM contractions, though some of the postulates for the latter are obviously missing from the above list. In what follows, we will denote by A the set of propositions that should be believed in the absence of A, that is, fC j A a Cg.
To end this section, we will de ne two notions that will play an important role in our analysis of contractions. It turns out that any contraction relation allows to`restore' the sets of propositions that are, respectively, believed and known in any epistemic state that generates it.
De nition 3.2. A proposition A will be said to be known with respect to a contraction relation a, if A a A holds; otherwise it will be called contingent. The set of all propositions that are known with respect to a will be called the knowledge set of a and denoted by K a .
According to the intended interpretation, K a consists of propositions that are known in an associated epistemic state. This set determines, in e ect, an internal logic that governs the behavior of contractions.
De nition 3.3. A proposition A will be said to be believed with respect to a contraction relation a, if f a A holds. The set of all such propositions will be called a belief set of a and denoted by B a .
As can be seen, B a coincides with f. In other words, it is a set of propositions that are believed in the absence of falsity f. On the intended interpretation, this is the set of propositions that are believed in the associated epistemic state.
The internal logic of contractions
If we compare our formalization with that of the AGM, we can notice that the underlying logic presupposed by the latter is not restricted to the classical entailment, but is taken to be what we will call a classical Tarski consequence relation, namely, an arbitrary consequence relation satisfying supraclassicality and the deduction theorem. It turns out, however, that this underlying logic can also be`restored' on the basis of our postulates, and this will show, in particular, how the relevant AGM postulates can be satis ed in our framework.
When we consider the role the underlying logic plays in the AGM theory of contractions, we nd three AGM postulates that depend on the underlying consequence relation: closure (K{1), success (K{4) and equivalence (K{6). Translated into our language, they read as follows: Accordingly, we will say that a contraction relation respects a consequence relation Th, if it satis es the above three conditions.
For any contraction relation a, we will denote by Th a the least classical consequence relation that includes the known propositions K a . Then the following result shows that Th a provides an adequate description of the logic underlying a given contraction relation.
Theorem 4.1. 1. Any contraction relation a respects Th a .
2. If a contraction relation satis es (CC) and (CS) with respect to a classical consequence relation Th, then the latter coincides with Th a . As the above result shows, instead of the classical entailment, we could as well choose Th a as our underlying logic. Moreover, in the latter case we would have that our contraction relation satis es the success postulate (CS). Thus, the e ect of the latter amounts to` xing' the underlying logic of contraction.
Representation theorem
We are going to show that our postulates provide an adequate description of contraction relations generated by abstract epistemic states. To begin with, we will de ne the notion of validity for contraction rules in an epistemic state.
For a proposition A and an abstract epistemic state E, we will denote by ]A the set of all admissible belief states from E that do not satisfy A.
De nition 5.1. A contraction rule A a B will be said to be valid with respect to an abstract epistemic state E if either A is contingent in E and B holds in all preferred states from ]A , or A is known in E and B is believed in E. The set of contraction rules that are valid in E will be denoted by a E .
As for ordinary nonmonotonic inference relations, given the above notion of validity, we need to restrict our attention to`well-behaved' epistemic states that guarantee existence of maximally preferred states for any proposition. It can be shown that any smooth epistemic state generates a contraction relation satisfying the above postulates. Moreover, we show also that any contraction is generated by some abstract epistemic state:
Representation Theorem 1. a is a contraction relation i there exists a smooth epistemic state E such that a coincides with a E .
A (rather complex) proof of the above representation theorem follows the general pattern of the ingenious proof given for preferential consequence relations in 8].
6 Re ned representations Isaac Levi has given in 9] an outline of an alternative coherentist theory of belief change that involves, in particular, weakening of some of the assumptions underlying the AGM approach (see also 7]). One of Levi's claims was that the monotonicity condition, according to which the preference relation on potential belief states must respect set inclusion, should be rejected, since not all growth in accepted beliefs constitutes a growth in informational value. Accordingly, he suggested that the monotonicity principle should be replaced by weak monotonicity that requires only that a`bigger' belief set should not be worse than the given one. In addition, he suggested that instead of taking the set all maximal subsets of a belief set K as a primary set of alternatives for choice, we should consider a broader class of`saturatable' theories, where a theory u is A-saturatable, for some proposition A, if Th(u; :A) is a world.
Generalizing a bit these ideas, we will introduce the following de nitions.
De nition 6.1. An abstract epistemic state E will be called 1. weakly monotonic if s t holds only when l(t) 6 l(s);
2. saturatable if, for any state s maximal in ]A , l(s) is an A-saturatable theory. The following result shows that the above conditions can be safely imposed on epistemic states without changing the class of contraction relations that are generated by them. Corollary 6.1. Any contraction relation is generated by some weakly monotonic and saturatable abstract epistemic state.
Standard epistemic states and`hidden' information
As has been said, a most plausible way of understanding non-standard epistemic states consists in the assumption that such states involve information that is not expressible in the current language. We consider here this assumption in more details. Standard epistemic states are language-relative objects, that is, they depend on the language in which they are formulated. Assume now that a language L is a restriction of another propositional language L 0 , and let E be some standard epistemic state in L 0 . This epistemic state generates some contraction relation in L 0 , and hence a certain contraction relation in the restricted language L. However, from the point of view of L, this epistemic state may permit di erent admissible states supporting the same belief set in L! In other words, a standard epistemic state E may give raise to a nonstandard abstract epistemic state in the restricted language L. Furthermore, it may well happen that the contraction relation in the language L generated by this standard state E is not representable by any standard epistemic state in L.
Fortunately, it turns out that any contraction relation is determined by a standard epistemic state in a certain extended language.
Representation Theorem 2. a is a contraction relation in a language L i there exists a standard epistemic state E in some language L 0 extending L such that a E restricted to L coincides with a.
Coherent contractions
Using epistemic states as our semantic representation, we can determine the meaning of various rationality postulates for contraction suggested by the AGM theory of belief change.
We begin with the following postulates that are valid both for the AGM and base-generated contractions. As can be seen, the above postulates correspond, respectively, to the AGM postulates of inclusion and vacuity. A contraction relation will be called coherent if it satis es these postulates.
The joint e ect of the above two postulates amounts to requiring that an abstract epistemic state should contain a most preferred admissible belief state k that includes all other admissible states in the sense that, for any admissible state s, l(s) l(k). Clearly, the state k will determine the belief set of the epistemic state. Abstract epistemic states satisfying this condition will also be called coherent. As can be easily checked, any coherent epistemic state makes valid both Inclusion and Vacuity. Moreover, we show that coherent epistemic states provide an adequate representation for coherent contraction relations.
Representation Theorem 3. A contraction relation a is coherent i there exists a coherent abstract epistemic state E such that a coincides with a E .
Though coherent epistemic states constitute a most common case we can meet in practice, we argue that coherence should not be considered as a rationality constraint on epistemic states, mainly because this may lead to an unjusti ed loss of information. This can be shown using a simple and well-worn example of contracting p^q from a belief set generated by a base fp; qg. If there are no preferences between the two elements of the base, such a contraction does not give us a natural new base. Our construction, however, gives for this case a quite reasonable and expected new belief set Th(p _ q), as well as a new epistemic state consisting of two theories, Th(p) and Th(q) (see 2] for further details).
A general coherentist paradigm
As we have said, a purely coherentist approach is embodied in the notion of a homogeneous coherent epistemic state. The following important result shows that such epistemic states are su cient to provide a representation for any coherent contraction.
Representation Theorem 4. For any coherent contraction a there exists a coherent homogeneous state E such that a E coincides with a.
Thus, any coherent contraction is generated by some coherent homogeneous epistemic state. We can require also that the relevant preference relation should satisfy weak monotonicity with respect to set inclusion. Note, however, that we cannot require strong monotonicity in this setting, since this would imply the validity of the recovery postulate (see below). Thus, the generality of our coherentist representation essentially depends on rejection of the strong maximization principle.
Recovering contractions
Finally, the famous and much disputed AGM postulate of recovery amounts in our setting to the following condition:
(CR) Recovery If f a B, then A a A ! B.
A contraction relation will be called a recovering contraction, if it is coherent and satis es Recovery. Clearly, such a contraction satis es all the basic postulates for the AGM contraction functions 1 It is easy to check that contraction relations determined by AGM-states satisfy recovery. We show also that such epistemic states provide an adequate representation of recovering contractions.
Representation Theorem 5. a is a recovering contraction i there exists an epistemic AGM state such that a E coincides with a.
Notice that the above representation result refers to arbitrary AGM states, not only to standard ones. This additional freedom (as compared with the standard AGM setting) is essential, as follows from a similar result for relational AGM-contractions proved by Hans Rott in 11]. As is shown, in e ect, by Rott, in order to have a representation in terms of AGM-states that are standard, we need to add some further (and less intuitive) conditions.
Conclusions
In order to provide a more adequate and uniform representation of belief change, we need a notion of an epistemic state more complex than simply a set of beliefs. We have demonstrated that the suggested explication of this notion subsumes the major existing approaches to representing belief change. Despite this generality, however, it determines natural belief change operations preserving much of the`rationality' embodied in the traditional AGM approach.
Our framework has allowed us also to provide a more exact setting for studying the relation between coherentist and foundationalist approaches to belief change. We have shown, in particular, that a (reasonably generalized) coherentist approach gives a comprehensive representation for a broad range of contraction operations. Speaking more generally, the relevant results can also be formulated as saying that an appropriately chosen preference relation can incorporate all the relevant information embodied in the dependence structure of an epistemic state.
Nevertheless, this situation should not be construed, on our opinion, as demonstrating the` nal victory' of coherentism. As was aptly noted by Hansson in 6] , the base of a belief set can relieve the preference mechanism of the majority of its functions; consequently, it can give a much more feasible (and computable) representation. A further support for the viability of the foundationalist approach can be found in 2].
Finally, the approach suggested in the paper has extended signi cantly the scope of G ardenfors-Makinson's thesis that belief change and nonmonotonic reasoning are \two sides of the same coin". The mutual fertilization of these two theories that was extensively used in the paper, has enriched us with a new interesting kind of nonmonotonic inference relations.
